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Ukrainians and their language 
The Act on the State Language of Ukraine
Tadeusz A. Olszański
On 25 April, the Supreme Council of Ukraine passed a law guaranteeing the role of the Ukrain-
ian language as the state language. The act was passed with a significant majority (278 in 
favour, 38 against), and was signed into law by President Petro Poroshenko on 15 May. This is 
not an act on the state’s language policy, but the role of the official language in the life of the 
country. The act is clearly aimed at eliminating Russian from as many spheres of community 
life in Ukraine as possible, especially from education and the media. The other, equally im-
portant task is to ensure development, standardisation, and modernisation of the Ukrainian 
language where there are currently shortcomings. 
The act, which was originally intended to be an instrument in Petro Poroshenko’s presiden-
tial campaign, will be used in the campaign for the early parliamentary elections of 21 July 
by the former president’s party and other groupings that form the broad anti-Russian camp. 
Opponents of the new act will probably contest it before the Constitutional Court, but rulings 
cannot be expected before the election. 
For the moment, it is unclear what position President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will take on the new 
act. It is possible that he will wish to amend some provisions. On one hand, during the presiden-
tial campaign, he frequently stated that the rights of the Russian-speaking population had to 
be guaranteed, while on the other his supporters include a large number of proponents of rad-
ical Ukrainization, whose support will be important to Zelenskiy in the parliamentary election. 
Ukrainian laws on language
Art. 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution of 1996 
states that “Ukrainian is the state language of 
Ukraine, and the state shall ensure comprehen-
sive development and functioning of the Ukrain-
ian language in all spheres of community life, 
(…) free development, use, and protection of 
Russian and other languages of national minor-
ities shall be guaranteed”. Although the Consti-
tution provides for the enactment of a separate 
act on the “use of languages in Ukraine”, for 
a long time the state’s policy on language was 
defined by the Act on Languages in the Ukrain-
ian Socialist Soviet Republic, passed in 1989. 
This act made the state language of the Ukrain-
ian Socialist Soviet Republic Ukrainian, but it 
guaranteed Russian the status of a “language 
of contact between nationalities”, and guaran-
teed that a bilingual system would be used in 
all spheres of community life (which in practice 
meant that Russian was the prevailing language 
in public offices and government; in many areas 
it was the sole language). 
Work on laws to regulate language issues has 
been undertaken a number of times, with a se-
ries of legislative proposals being submitted. 
Some of these were aimed at displacing Russian 
as the language used in state affairs, and even 
community life, while others were aimed at 
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guaranteeing Russian the maximum presence 
in state and community life, or de facto intro-
duction of a bilingual system (the Constitution 
unequivocally prohibits a de iure bilingual sys-
tem). As there are no general laws in this re-
gard, particular aspects of the state’s language 
policy (such as the language used in education, 
in court procedures, government office proce-
dures, etc.) were regulated in detailed statutes 
and normative acts of lower status; a large por-
tion of these led to restriction of use of Russian. 
It was not until 2012, when Viktor Yanukovych 
was in office, that a new act on language was 
successfully pushed through, enabling, among 
other things, an official bilingual system to be in-
troduced in particular districts and low-level ad-
ministrative units. This act only came into force 
in a formal way, and was commonly considered 
as a sanctioning of the status quo. In particu-
lar, no attempts were made to introduce a bilin-
gual system at regional level. When Yanukovych 
was removed from office, the Supreme Council 
of Ukraine repealed the 2012 act, in the midst 
of a rise in patriotism, but this decision did not 
become legally effective. It was not until 2018 
that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court repealed 
that act, and the Supreme Council began work 
on new legislation. In turn, in 2017, a new Edu-
cation Act was passed which restricted the use 
of Russian and languages of national minorities 
as a language of instruction. Towards the end 
of 2018, a new bill was proposed and passed in 
the first reading, defining the role of the official 
language in state and community life. 
2082 changes to this act were submitted. Some 
remedied major shortcomings in the bill, while 
most were intended to prevent the bill being 
passed before the presidential election. The Su-
preme Council rejected all of the suggested 
changes, forcing the architects to take a measure 
that was at best questionable from a formal point 
of view: immediately after the last of the changes 
was rejected, parliamentary committee represent-
ative Mykola Kniazhytskyi submitted a motion for 
56 of the amendments to be voted upon again, 
due to them “wrongly” being rejected, as this 
was contrary to committee recommendations. 
The wording of the changes was not discussed – 
the parliamentary committee representative only 
listed the numbers. A vote was held in which the 
changes were approved en bloc, and next the 
act was passed in its entirety, “including the cor-
rections made to the transcript”. 
Following more attempts by opponents to stop 
it (a number of proposals for resolutions annul-
ling the vote of 25 April were submitted), on 
14 May the Supreme Council speaker was able 
to sign the bill and present it to the president 
(it was signed by Petro Poroshenko on 15 May). 
The act itself – subject to numerous vacatio le-
gis, some lasting as long as three years – will 
come into force on 16 July this year. 
Main aim of the new act
The new language act has two goals, which 
are to eliminate Russian from official state af-
fairs and restrict its use in community life, and 
to guarantee development, standardisation, 
and modernisation of the Ukrainian language 
where there are shortcomings. The last of these 
is to be achieved by the creation of a new cen-
tral authority, the National Committee for the 
Status of the State Language. The committee 
will be responsible among other things for ad-
judicating on questions of proper usage and 
spelling (similar to the powers of the Council 
for the Polish language). 
The new act is aimed at eliminating Rus-
sian from the life of the country and re-
ducing its use in community life, and is 
also intended to ensure development, 
standardisation, and modernisation of the 
Ukrainian language. 
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Despite the fact that the preamble refers to peo-
ple “colonising and occupying” (using the plural 
form) Ukraine, the law is clearly directed towards 
Russia and the Russian language, because it al-
lows, in almost every area, parallel use of Ukrain-
ian and “official EU languages”, which means 
that this includes Polish, Hungarian, Slovakian, 
and Romanian. The act explicitly prohibits an in-
terchangeable bilingual system, i.e. use of Rus-
sian instead of Ukrainian, and only permits a par-
allel bilingual system, i.e. use of two languages 
of equal status on signs and in texts, etc. 
The rules specified in the act do not apply to pri-
vate contact, religious practices, cultural events 
with a defined number of participants (unclear 
expression), and the language used in perfor-
mance of songs, opera performances, etc. Laws 
on cultural establishments only mention publicly 
run and municipal establishments, and private 
institutions are exempt from the relevant regula-
tions. The act confirms the regulations in effect 
to date in judicial procedure codes, regarding 
use of languages other than the state language. 
In relations with consumers, patients, etc. (but 
not petitioners) it is permitted to use a language 
“convenient to both parties” which gives some 
leeway to Russian speakers, but also to Hungar-
ians, who make up the majority in part of the 
Transcarpathian region. 
The act prohibits the screening of films (regard-
less of the form in which they are screened) 
without dubbing or voiceover. Subtitles are 
treated as a special form (which is established 
practice in Ukraine). In unusually detailed reg-
ulations on use of the state language in the 
media, culture, sport, advertising, etc., a lot re-
mains unclear. Ukrainization of the media has 
now largely been assured under earlier, secto-
rial regulations. 
Criminal provisions in the act only provide for 
administrative liability; the act does not make 
any additions to the criminal code. The coming 
into force of these provisions has been deferred 
for three years because most of the norms for 
which punitive measures are intended are due 
to come into force at a much later time.
The act is poorly drafted and contains many 
loopholes and ambiguities, and will need of-
ficial interpretations and amendments. At the 
same time, it is extraordinarily detailed and ca-
suistic. Even worse, not only does it not dele-
gate powers to issue secondary, implementing 
legislation, in fact it prohibits such actions – the 
status of the official language is to be regulat-
ed solely in statutes, down to the tiniest detail. 
In terms of quality and casuistics, the act is no 
different in fact to Ukrainian laws. 
Status of the Ukrainian language 
The act requires Ukrainian citizens to be able 
to speak the state language. For people who 
are Ukrainian citizens this does not have any 
implications, while the appropriate examina-
tion will be introduced for people applying for 
citizenship (a system used in many countries). 
This will not take effect until two years after 
the act comes into force, due to the need to 
determine the standards of command of the 
language and devise the language proficiency 
tests. Due to this last necessity, a similar vacatio 
legis was introduced for many other provisions, 
including a requirement for public officials to 
have a command of the language1. 
1 Noticeably, the reduction in the final changes of require-
ments for those officers: they are only required to “have 
a command of the state language”, and not use it with 
ease/fluently as in the original proposal.
The act is poorly drafted and contains 
many loopholes and ambiguities, and will 
need official interpretations and amend-
ments. At the same time, it is extraordi-
narily detailed and casuistic. Even worse, 
it explicitly prohibits issuance of second-
ary, implementing legislation.
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Many provisions in the act are intended to en-
sure the appropriate quality of the Ukrainian 
language, its development and normalisation, 
and combat borrowings from other languages 
and vulgarisms (a large portion of Ukrainian 
vulgarisms are taken from Russian), but also 
preserve dialects. A notable amount of atten-
tion is paid in the act to development of Ukrain-
ian sign language. 
The act gives people of foreign origin the right 
to demand acknowledgement of the special na-
tional spelling of their names (for example Kowal- 
ski, not Kowalśkyj). It also explicitly prohibits 
translation of first names and surnames. In the 
case of surnames, this has occurred in the past, 
for example the Russian surname Skworcow be-
ing recorded in state registers as Szpakow (both 
names are derived from the word for starling). 
In official documents in which the Latin alpha-
bet is used, on the other hand, surnames of this 
kind are to be transcribed from Ukrainian and 
not left in the original Latin form. 
An act on Indigenous and Minority Languag-
es is to be passed to complement the act. To 
date, a bill has not been submitted and it will 
not be possible for it to be passed during this 
parliamentary session2. Significantly, nothing 
is being said about the currently applicable 
Act on National Minorities of Ukraine of 1992; 
2 The name given to this bill contains a misrepresenta-
tion which is now used commonly in Ukraine. This is not 
a question of indigenous languages (i.e. languages of 
which there are no speakers, including elsewhere than 
Ukraine) in the plural. It only concerns the Crimean Tatar 
language. The two other indigenous languages (Karaite 
and Krymchak languages) were spoken in 1989 (recently 
available data) by 114 and 150 respectively 
in a reference to an act on “measures to realise 
the rights of indigenous nations and national 
minorities”, inserted during the most recent 
changes, it is unclear whether this means the 
1992 act or the new, forthcoming legislation. 
Languages of minorities in education
Art. 21 of the act, which is the only article that 
addresses education issues, states that “persons 
belonging to national minorities in Ukraine are 
guaranteed a right to learn at municipal educa-
tion establishments in order to gain a preschool 
and primary school education in addition to 
the state language in the language of the rel-
evant national minority in Ukraine. This right 
is realised by creating, as provided for by law 
[the Act on the Education System and, as ap-
plicable, special acts in the future – OSW] sep-
arate classes (groups) with instruction provided 
in the language of the relevant national minori-
ty of Ukraine, together with the state language, 
and this does not extend to classes (groups) 
in which instruction is given in the state lan-
guage”. This poorly drafted provision should 
be seen as allowing, in preschool and primary 
schools (but not secondary schools) bilingual 
classes with instruction in the official language 
and in the minority language as well. Experi-
ence shows (for example in Poland between 
the first and second world wars, when this was 
very common) that bilingual instruction gives 
rise to numerous conflicts regarding the share 
of the two languages in teaching, and makes 
it necessary for state authorities to intervene 
in the teaching process. For indigenous nations, 
this right is extended to secondary school, but 
for these as well, it is not permitted to provide 
education solely in the minority language. 
Further on, this article guarantees persons be-
longing to indigenous nations and national 
minorities the right to learn their language“ 
in municipal comprehensive secondary school 
establishments or through national and cultural 
societies”. This provision does not mention the 
The act only allows instruction in nation-
al minority languages in primary schools, 
and this must be in addition to instruction 
in Ukrainian. This poorly drafted law will 
lead to controversy and conflict.
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teaching of particular subjects in the minority 
language, only the teaching of that language 
as a subject. This could be seen as prohibiting 
the teaching of history and culture of a minor-
ity community as a separate subject, or that it 
requires that subject to be taught in Ukrainian. 
There is some leeway in this provision, allowing 
local government authorities to shift responsi-
bility for teaching languages of minorities on to 
national minority societies. 
The article also states further that “educational 
establishments, in particular vocational (voca-
tional technical establishments, and pre-high-
er and higher education vocational establish-
ments, shall provide obligatory teaching of the 
state language to an extent enabling work in an 
occupation in a particular branch using the state 
language”. A little further on, the article reads 
“At the request of persons attending vocation-
al training (vocational technical) and pre-high-
er and higher vocational training, educational 
establishments shall offer the opportunity for 
them to learn the language of their indigenous 
nation or language of a national minority of 
Ukraine as a separate subject”. Although this 
is ambiguous wording, there is no doubt that 
the right to learn a minority language in those 
schools is not as well protected as in primary 
schools and comprehensive secondary schools: 
there is no mention of guarantees, only crea-
tion of opportunities. 
Point 5(21) states that “in educational establish-
ments, according to the teaching curriculum, 
one or more subjects can be taught in two or 
more languages: in the state language, in Eng-
lish, and in other official languages of the Eu-
ropean Union”. This provision allows the exist-
ence of schools in which instruction is partially 
in a bilingual system (in general, secondary 
schools run by foreign firms) as well as leeway 
for national minorities to maintain or create bi-
lingual private schools and fight to retain the 
currently existing method of teaching in public 
“minority” schools. This provision also applies 
to all educational establishments regardless of 
ownership. 
The act abolishes the requirement to take a sec-
ondary school-leaving examination (external, 
independent assessment) and preliminary exam-
inations for universities in languages other than 
Ukrainian, except for foreign language examina-
tions. Detailed rules on use of various languages 
in education are to be specified in special acts, 
not the Act on the Educational System.
Art. 21 will come into force two months after 
the act is signed, but interim provisions post-
pone enactment of the amendment concerning 
school-leaving examinations until 2030 (accord-
ing to the original draft of the bill – until 2025). 
Students of comprehensive secondary schools 
who belong to national minorities, who com-
menced education in a minority language on or 
before 1 September 2018, will continue stud-
ying according to the present rules up to no 
later than 1 September 2020, but “with a grad-
ual increase in the number of subjects taught 
in Ukrainian”. However, if a particular minority 
language is also an official language of the Eu-
ropean Union, this deadline will be extended 
until 1 September 2023.
This is clearly contradictory: on one hand 
the current rules are to remain in place until 
2020/2023, while on the other the number of 
subjects taught in a minority language is to be 
decreased, which means that the rules are to 
be changed. The act does not specify which 
The overall intention behind this educa-
tion legislation is to abolish as quickly as 
possible schools in which instruction is 
in Russian, limit teaching of Russian as 
a subject as much as possible, and mit-
igate criticism on the part of Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania by deferring the 
date of ultimate Ukrainization of second-
ary schools in which instruction is given 
in the language of those nations.
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subjects can be taught solely in a minority lan-
guage (usually these are the minority language 
itself, the history and culture, and study of re-
ligion in school, where provided). At the same 
time, the fact that the education minister can-
not perform an interpretation of the act means 
that the task of resolving these doubts falls to 
local government authorities (as the founding 
authorities), if not on headteachers directly. 
This means that a uniform state policy cannot 
be formed in this respect, and this will lead to 
numerous local conflicts. 
The overall intention behind this provision is 
clear, and that is to abolish as quickly as possi-
ble schools in which instruction is in Russian, to 
limit teaching of Russian as a subject as much 
as possible, prevent these processes being 
hampered if there is a change of government, 
and to mitigate criticism on the part of Hunga-
ry, Poland, and Romania by deferring the date 
of ultimate  Ukrainization of secondary schools 
in which instruction is given in the language of 
those nations. 
The social context of the act
The new language act is being enacted in 
a society that is significantly different to that of 
1989, and even 2012. The view that the Ukrain-
ian population is divided into two large groups, 
Ukrainian-speaking (presumably knowing Rus-
sian) and Russian-speaking (presumably unable 
to speak Ukrainian) is no longer true. After al-
most thirty years of functioning of a state that 
mainly uses (and to an ever-increasing extent) 
Ukrainian, as well as an education system that 
gives all students at least an elementary com-
mand of Ukrainian, there is now practically 
nobody who does not understand the state 
language. 
While there are no credible statistics concerning 
the current percentage of people who speak 
Ukrainian and Russian at home and in their so-
cial and professional life, or the ability to read 
and write in those languages, ordinary observa-
tion suggests a significant increase in the role 
played by the Ukrainian language in the lives of 
Ukrainian citizens. 
One of the most important aspects of the fight 
for Ukrainization of community life is measures 
to make Ukrainian the dominant, if not only, 
language used in the media, from the press and 
book market through cinema, the stage, and tel-
evision, to advertising. This is not only a question 
of dominance in political and cultural affairs: 
this involves the interests of artists and me-
dia companies, and this translates into large 
amounts of money. This is why previous at-
tempts at Ukrainization of these sectors are so 
controversial. The changes made in this respect 
in the act are not ground-breaking; they only 
make previously existing requirements stricter. 
Over the last five years, the young generations 
in central and eastern Ukraine have spoken out 
firmly in favour of maintaining the integrity of 
the country, and this includes the role of the 
official language. There is a notable desire to 
learn that language and use it in official situ-
ations. Even those who do not agree with the 
western Ukrainian view that Ukrainian serves as 
the very jewel of national identity acknowledge 
that a command of the language is an impor-
tant element of civil identity. 
On the other hand, the role played in com-
munity life by the elder generation and the 
layers of the least educated people (among 
whom the percentage of people who do not 
speak and are incapable of learning Ukrainian 
is considerable) continues to decrease. With the 
loss of control over the Crimea and part of the 
Over the last five years, the young gener-
ation in central and eastern Ukraine have 
spoken out firmly in favour of maintaining 
the integrity and constitutional govern-
ance of the country, and this includes the 
part played by the official language.
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Donbas, the number of active Ukrainian citizens 
refusing to speak Ukrainian for ideological (po-
litical) reasons has decreased significantly. All 
of this combined will mean that the new lan-
guage act should be accepted without a great 
deal of resistance.
Political implications
The intention of making the new language act 
the driving force in Poroshenko’s election cam-
paign was unsuccessful. This is not only due to 
obstruction in parliament, forcing the bill to be 
passed after the presidential election. It is also 
due to Poroshenko’s loss of popularity being 
too great. On the other hand, seeing the matter 
through to the end will be an attribute for him 
and his supporters, as well as his rivals in the 
patriotic camp, in the parliamentary campaign, 
which will determine not only the former pres-
ident’s political future, but also that of Prime 
Minister Volodymyr Hroysman and parliament 
speaker Andriy Parubiy and their supporters. 
Prior to his inauguration, President Volodymyr 
Zelenskiy did not take a definitive stance on 
the subject of the act, suggesting only that it 
needed to be determined whether it was con-
stitutional. His priority and that of his milieu is 
now to win the early parliamentary elections, 
which will mean charming all of the elements 
of his diverse electorate. Zelenskiy also must be 
aware that his spectacular success in the central 
and western parts of the country was due to 
the massive support that he also received from 
proponents of a dominant role of the Ukrainian 
language. 
The error made by people in the senior posts in 
the Supreme Council, which was that it did not 
announce, at the same time as the Act on the 
State Language, the Act on National Minority 
Languages, may give the new president the op-
tion of taking other action. The bill on minority 
languages, which will be drafted by his office 
could significantly modify certain key princi-
ples of the new language policy, and even make 
amendments to the May act. It cannot be ruled 
out that he will wish to use the issue in his par-
ty’s election campaign. However, everything will 
depend on which political groups gain a decisive 
influence over the new president, and who will 
formulate his views and in what way. 
The international implications of the new lan-
guage act being passed will be harmful to Kyiv. 
It is clear that Hungary will not stop fighting 
to maintain the current rights of its minority in 
Ukraine and will block Kyiv’s cooperation with 
NATO. Romania and Bulgaria will also be scep-
tical about the new law. Russian will certainly 
use this act to undermine Ukraine’s “democrat-
ic credibility”.
